Lendas sobre o Airbus

[Anonymous]

Prezados amigos do Aerofórum

Vou postar aqui o texto que postei na seção AeroEnquetes & Avisos sobre o Airbus.

Desde que a Airbus introduziu o magnífico Fly-by-Wire nos comandos primários do A320 nos anos 80, muitas lendas sobre estas aeronaves e este sistema surgiram. Acredito que muitas lendas vieram dos fabricantes americanos, até então "donos do campinho", outras de desinformação e outras dos "conservadores".

O que o Spetsnaz escreveu deve ter sido fruto dele ter escutado essas lendas. Eu também já ouvi muitas lendas sobre os Airbus e sobre o Fly-by-Wire. Porém, após um pouco de estudo e contato com pessoas que conhecem o Airbus, descobri que eram mentiras.

Os comandos de vôo do Airbus FBW refinam os comandos, mas jamais a aeronave fará algo sem o consentimento do piloto ou comando deste. O piloto tem total controle do avião, o FBW ou o piloto automático não farão ações sozinhos, como dizem algumas lendas sobre os Airbus FBW. O que o FBW não permite em Normal e Alternate Law é exceder o envelope de vôo. Mas o piloto poderá fazer uma arfagem ou rolagem mais vigorosa se quiser.

Muitos dizem que essa proteção eventualmente impede de fazer um desvio brusco excedendo o envelope. Eu pergunto: mais vale uma aeronave com proteção de envelope de vôo (olhem que o envelope de vôo é bem amplo), como a do Airbus FBW, com TCAS para evitar colisões, ou uma aeronave sem esta proteção, que pode entrar em atitude anormal em caso de uma desorientação espacial?

Uma prova da utilidade do FBW é que a própria Boeing utiliza o sistema no excelente 777 e acredito que no 787 também. Ou seja, não é excentricidade da Airbus. Vale lembrar que o FBW teve origem na NASA e foi utilizado no mítico Concorde.

Quanto ao sidestick, eu o acho fantástico! Como numa aeronave com manche convencional você praticamente não utiliza o lado interno do volante (a não ser entre a V1 e o AUTOPILOT ON - poucos minutos), pois geralmente sem piloto automático é uma mão no manche (lado externo) e outra mão na manete, acredito que o lado interno do manche é praticamente inútil numa aeronave com FBW - e até numa sem ele. Numa aeronave sem FBW não muito pesada até faz sentido o lado interno do manche no caso de uma manual reversion (perda do comando hidráulico dos comandos) para comandar os ailerons. Já o profundor é no poste do manche mesmo. Ele também é útil quando se quer levar uma aeronave sem FBW "na mão", algo raro. O sidestick permite um considerável ganho de ergonomia e espaço na cabine, além de facilitar a visualização dos instrumentos.

O auto-thrust é outra coisa bem interessante, numa comparação grosseira, é como um carro automático com câmbio seqüencial: ele é automático, você coloca no ponto desejado, mas se quiser comanda manualmente.

Quanto a voar com piloto automático, realmente a regra nas empresas é ele sempre ligado, mas em ambas aeronaves (Airbus ou Boeing / McDonnell Douglas) é possível voar sem ele, porém é algo incomum.

Quanto mais eu estudo os Airbus, mas me fascino por eles! Porém, admiro os Boeing, McDonnel Douglas, Lockheed, Embraer, ATR e outros também.

Se eu falei algo incorreto, peço que os colegas aqui que voam Airbus (Castelo?) me corrijam!

Um abraço

VSBresolin

[Anonymous]

é bem por aí mesmo, mas sobre o auto thurst, ele tem 4 posições: idle, cruise, T/O e reverse, e não dá pra usar um meio termo

[Anonymous]

O auto thurst não é o mesmo que auto-throttle mas sem o movimento das manetes?

[Phenom]

Reverse, Idle, Climb (CLB), Flex Tkoff (FLX) e To/Ga (T/O).

Abraço

[CS-TMX]

Código: Selecionar todos

AUTOTHRUST

This Topic is relevant to the whole fleet

GENERAL

The autothrust (A/THR) is a function of the FMGS, it includes 2 independent A/THR commands, one per FMGC. Each one is able to control the thrust of both engines simultaneously through 2 Engine Interface Units and 2 Electronic Engine Controls (PW or RR engines) or 2 Engine Control Units (GE engines). Only one FMGC controls the active A/THR, it is called the master FMGC.

Thrust is controlled :
	

automatically when the A/THR is active
	

manually by the pilot.

The autothrust is active when the A/THR pushbutton of the FCU is lighted green and A/THR is displayed white in the FMA 5th column.

The position of the thrust levers determines whether A/THR is armed, active, or disconnected.

The autothrust system, when active :
	

maintains a specific thrust in THRUST mode
	

controls the aircraft speed or MACH in SPEED/MACH mode
	

uses ALPHA FLOOR mode to set maximum thrust when the aircraft angle of attack exceeds a specific threshold.

The autothrust system can operate independently or with the AP/FD.
	

When performing alone, A/THR always controls the speed.
	

If the autothrust system is working with the AP/FD, the A/THR mode and AP/FD pitch modes are linked together. (Refer to 1.22.30 Interaction between AP/FD and A/THR modes).

When autothrust is active, the FMGS commands the thrust according to the vertical mode logic, but uses a thrust not greater than the thrust commanded by the position of the thrust lever. For example, when the thrust levers are set at the CL (climb) detent, the autothrust system can command thrust between idle and max climb.

The autothrust system, when armed, automatically activates if the thrust levers are moved into the active range sector. Outside of this range, thrust levers control thrust directly.

MASTER A/THR

The thrust being controlled by one A/THR only, when one AP is engaged, priority is given to the associated autothrust.

When both APs are engaged or no AP/FD engaged, A/THR 1 has the priority.

THRUST LEVERS

The pilot uses the thrust levers to do the following :
	

Manually select engine thrust.
	

Arm and activate autothrust (A/THR).
	

Engage reverse thrust.
	

Engage the takeoff and go around modes.

When autothrust is disconnected, the thrust levers control thrust directly : each lever position corresponds to a given thrust.

4 detents divide each of the thrust lever sectors into three segments. The detents are :
TO GA	 :  	Maximum takeoff thrust
FLX MCT	 :  	Maximum continuous thrust (or FLX at takeoff)
CL	 :  	Maximum climb thrust
IDLE	 :  	Idle thrust.

When the thrust levers are at the IDLE position, the pilot can pull the reverse levers.

A/THR ARMING CONDITIONS

There are a considerable number of A/THR arming conditions. The following is a list of the most important ones :
	

One FMGC operative
	

2 ADIRS operative
	

2 FADECs operative
	

One operative FCU channel
	

One LGCIU operative
	

A/THR is not manually disabled (instinctive disconnect pushbutton has not been pressed for more than 15 seconds).

The pilot arms the A/THR :
	

On ground :
	

By pushing the A/THR pushbutton on the FCU when the engines are not running, or
	

By setting the thrust levers at the FLX or TOGA detent when the engines are running.
	

In flight :
	

By pushing the A/THR pushbutton on the FCU while the thrust levers are out of the active range, or
	

While A/THR is active ("A/THR" white on the FMA), by setting all thrust levers beyond the CL detent or at least one lever above the MCT detent, or
	

By engaging the go around mode.

When the A/THR is armed :
	

The FCU's A/THR pushbutton light comes on
	

"A/THR" is displayed in blue on the FMA


Note : At takeoff, if the thrust levers are set back to idle, the A/THR disengages and cannot be rearmed until airborne.

A/THR ACTIVATION

The A/THR is active when it controls thrust or speed. The position of the thrust lever determines the maximum thrust that the A/THR system can command (except in -floor condition).

The A/THR
being armed,
is activated :
	

when the pilot sets both thrust levers between the CL and IDLE detents (two engines operative)
	

when the pilot sets one thrust lever between the MCT and IDLE detents (one engine inoperative).

The A/THR being disconnected, is activated when the pilot pushes the FCU pushbutton while the thrust levers are within the active range, including IDLE position

Note : When the pilot sets both thrust levers to IDLE position, the A/THR disconnects but, if the pilot pushes the A/THR pushbutton of the FCU, he will simultaneously arm and activate the autothrust. Due to the thrust levers position, IDLE thrust will be maintained.
	

when ALPHA FLOOR is activated, regardless of the initial status of A/THR and the position of the thrust levers.

When A/THR is active :
	

The A/THR pushbutton on the FCU lights up.
	

The FMA displays A/THR mode in green in the first column and A/THR in white in the fifth column.



      EFFECTS OF THRUST LEVER MOVEMENT WHILE A/THR IS ACTIVE
      	

      When both thrust levers are set above the CL detent (both engines operative) or one thrust lever is set above MCT (one engine operative) the A/THR reverts from active to armed. "A/THR" turns to blue on the FMA and the thrust levers control the thrust directly. The FMA displays "MAN THR" white in its first column.

      The thrust levers provide the crew with an immediate increase of thrust when both thrust levers are pushed above the CL detent (2 engines) or the active thrust lever above the MCT detent (one engine operative).
      	

      When both thrust levers are set below the CL detent (both engines operative) or one thrust lever is set below MCT (one engine operative), a repeating warning (amber caution, single chime, ECAM message "A/THR LIMITED") is activated every 5 seconds until the pilot moves the levers back into the detent. "THR LVR" green is displayed on the FMA.

      "LVR CLB" (both engines operative) or "LVR MCT" (one engine operative) flashes white in the first column of the FMA.

      This device reminds the crew that the normal operating position of the thrust levers, when A/THR is active, is the CL detent (2 engines) or the MCT detent (one engine operative).
      	

      When one thrust lever is in the CL detent and the other one out of the detent, the "LVR ASYM" amber message comes up until both levers are set in the CL detent (only with both engines operative).

A/THR DISCONNECT

When the A/THR is disconnected, it is neither armed nor active.

The A/THR can be disconnected in two ways :

    *

      Standard disconnection
      	

      The pilot pushes the instinctive disconnect pushbutton on the thrust levers (which immediately sets the thrust corresponding to the lever positions) or
      	

      The pilot sets both thrust levers to IDLE detent.
    *

      Non-standard disconnection
      	

      The pilot pushes the A/THR pushbutton on the FCU while A/THR is armed/active, or
      	

      The system loses one of the arming conditions.

      Below 100 feet radio altitude

      When the radio altitude is below 100 feet and the pilot sets both thrust levers above the CL detent or one above the MCT detent, the autothrust will disconnect. It will rearm automatically when at least one of the thrust levers is set to TOGA.

      If the PF set thrust levers above CL detent but below TOGA and come back to CL detent, the A/THR will disconnect and remain disconnected. As a result, the thrust will increase up to CLIMB thrust. The crew has to manually set the appropriate thrust for landing (or go around).

CAUTION

If the pilot pushes and holds one instinctive disconnect pushbutton for more than 15 seconds, the A/THR system is disconnected for the remainder of the flight. All A/THR functions, including ALPHA FLOOR, are lost and they can only be recovered at the next FMGC power-up (on ground).

THRUST LOCK FUNCTION

The THRUST LOCK function is activated when the thrust levers are in the CL detent (or in the MCT detent with one engine-out), and the pilot pushes the FCU A/THR pushbutton, or the A/THR disconnects due to a failure.

The thrust is locked at its level prior to disconnection. Moving the thrust levers out of the CL or MCT detent suppresses the thrust lock, and reverts to manual control.

When the thrust lock function is active :
	

"THR LK" flashes amber on the FMA.
	

ECAM "ENG THRUST LOCKED" flashes every five seconds.
	

ECAM displays "THR LEVERS...... MOVE"
	

A single chime sounds and the Master Caution Light flashes every five seconds.

All warnings cease, when the pilot moves the thrust levers out of the detent.

A/THR DISCONNECT CAUTION

The standard disconnection triggers a temporary ECAM message, and a single chime.

The non-standard disconnection (A/THR pushbutton pressed on the FCU, or A/THR failure) triggers continuous visual cautions until the pilot reacts. The single chime sounds.

	A/THR DISCONNECTION

BY INSTINCTIVE DISCONNECT
OR SETTING TWO LEVERS TO
IDLE (if above 50 ft RA) 	BY OTHER MEANS
CONSEQUENCE 	MASTER CAUTION 	Is on for 3 sec max 	On
ECAM MESSAGE 	
Amber A/THR OFF message :
9 sec maximum 	
Flashing "ENG THRUST LOCKED",
amber AUTO FLT A/THR OFF,
THR LEVERS..... MOVE (blue)
AUDIO 	Single chime 	Single chime

CLR pushbutton on
ECAM CONTROL
PANEL 	OFF 	ON
ACTION 	
MASTER CAUTION
pushbutton 	
Turns off the MASTER CAUTION light, and erases ECAM message. 	Turns off the MASTER CAUTION light.

CLR puhbutton on
ECAM CONTROL
PANEL 	No effect 	
Turns off the MC light and CLR pushbutton, and erases the ECAM message. Calls status.

INSTINCTIVE
DISCONNECT
pushbutton 	
Turns off the MASTER CAUTION light, and erases the ECAM message. 	Turns off the MASTER CAUTION light.
ECAM STATUS MESSAGE 	NO 	YES

A/THR MODES

Except in takeoff and go around situations, normal operation of the A/THR system requires the thrust levers to be :
	

In the CL detent for the two-engine configuration. If they are not set in the CL detent, "LVR CLB" flashes white on the FMA.
	

In MCT detent when in the one-engine-out configuration. If the appropriate lever is not set in the MCT detent, "LVR MCT" flashes white on the FMA.

The A/THR modes are selected automatically in conjunction with the AP/FD modes (except for ALPHA FLOOR).


A/THR in THRUST mode 	
AP/FD pitch mode maintains the speed :
OP CLB - OP DES - CLB - FLARE and DES (IDLE path)

A/THR in SPEED/MACH mode 	
If neither AP nor FD is engaged

If AP/FD controls a vertical path
V/S-FPA-ALT*- ALT CST*-ALT-ALT CRZ-G/S*
-G/S-FINAL and DES (geometric path)

A/THR in RETARD mode 	
Automatic landing (AP engaged in LAND mode).

THRUST mode
	

In THRUST mode, autothrust commands a specific thrust level in conjunction with the AP/FD pitch mode. This thrust level is limited by thrust lever position.

FMA display 	Meaning
THR MCT 	The most advanced thrust lever is in the MCT detent (engine out)
THR CLB 	The most advanced thrust lever in the CL detent
THR LVR 	Either thrust levers are below CT or MCT or at least one thrust lever is in CL detent and the other above CL detent
THR IDLE 	Minimum thrust (both engines at IDLE thrust)

Note : When the A/THR is armed for takeoff or go around, the FMA displays "MAN TOGA" (or "MAN FLX" or MAN DTO ) in white to remind the crew that the thrust levers have been positioned properly.

RETARD mode

The RETARD mode is available only during automatic landing (AP engaged in LAND mode). RETARD mode engages at approximately 40 feet RA and remains engaged after touchdown.

The A/THR commands IDLE thrust during the flare and the FMA and engine warning display show "IDLE".

If the autopilot is disengaged during the flare before touchdown, the SPEED mode replaces RETARD mode, and the pilot has to reduce thrust manually.

Note : In automatic landing, the system generates a "RETARD" callout at 10 feet RA, which prompts the pilot to move the thrust levers to IDLE in order to confirm thrust reduction. In manual landing conditions, the system generates this callout as a reminder at 20 feet RA.

SPEED/MACH mode

In SPEED/MACH mode, the A/THR adjusts the thrust in order to acquire and hold a speed or Mach target.

The speed or Mach target may be :
	

selected on the FCU by the pilot
	

managed by the FMGC.

When in SPEED or MACH mode, the A/THR does not allow speed excursions beyond the following limits regardless of the target speed or Mach number :
	

For a selected speed target, the limits are VLS and VMAX (VMO-MMO, VFE-VLE, whichever applies).
	

For a managed speed target, the limits are maneuvering speed (Green Dot, S, F, whichever applies) and maximum speed (320/.84-VFE-VLE whichever applies).

The changeover from SPEED to MACH mode is either automatically, performed by the FMGC or manually by the pilot (in selected speed target only) by pushing the SPD/MACH change-over pushbutton.

The FMA displays "SPEED" or "MACH".



      MACH MODE IN CRUISE PHASE (A/THR SOFT MODE)

      When the aircraft is in ALT CRZ mode with the autopilot engaged, autothrust engaged in MACH mode, and is within a +/-3 knot range of the target speed, the autothrust soft mode engages. This mode reduces the thrust variation in cruise, specifically in light turbulence. The autothrust soft mode disengages, when the speed deviation from the target becomes too large or the target is modified ; autothrust transition from soft to basic mode may lead to transient thrust variation. This mode is inhibited with the speedbrakes extended, or with an engine-out, or when the Mach target is below 0.65.

SPEED MODE IN APPROACH PHASE

When the aircraft flies an approach in managed speed, the speed target displayed on the PFD in magenta, is variable during the approach.

This managed speed target is computed in the FMGS, using the "ground speed mini" function.



      GROUND SPEED MINI FUNCTION PRINCIPLE

      The purpose of the ground speed mini function is to take advantage of the aircraft's inertia, when the wind conditions vary during the approach. It does so by providing the crew with an adequate indicated speed target. When the aircraft flies this indicated speed target, the energy of the aircraft is maintained above a minimum level, ensuring standard aerodynamic margins versus stall.

      If the A/THR is active in SPEED mode, it will automatically follow the speed target, ensuring efficient thrust management during the approach.

      The minimum energy level is the energy level the aircraft will have at touchdown, if it lands at VAPP speed with the Tower-reported wind as inserted in the PERF APPR page.

      The minimum energy level is represented by the Ground Speed the aircraft will have at touchdown. This Ground Speed is called "GROUND SPD MINI".

      During the approach, the FMGS continuously computes the speed target using the wind experienced by the aircraft in order to keep the ground speed at, or above, the "Ground Speed Mini".

      The lowest speed target is lower limited to VAPP, and is upper limited by VFE of next configuration in CONF 1, 2, 3 and VFE – 5 in CONF FULL.

      The speed target is displayed on the PFD speed scale in magenta, when approach phase and managed speed are active. It is independent of the AP/FD, and/or ATHR engagements.

      Wind is a key factor in the ground speed mini function.


      TWR WIND

      TWR WIND is the MAG WIND entered in the PERF approach page. It is the average wind, provided by the ATIS or the Tower. Gusts must not be inserted ; they are included in the aircraft target speed computation.


      TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT

      The TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT is the component of the MAG WIND projected
      on the runway axis
      (landing runway entered in the flight plan). It is used to compute VAPP and GS mini. . The TWR wind is the wind announced by the ATC and entered in the PERF APPR page (MAG WIND field).


      CURRENT HEADWIND COMPONENT

      The actual wind measured by ADIRS is projected
      on the aircraft axis
      to define the CURRENT HEADWIND COMPONENT (instantaneous headwind). The CURRENT HEADWIND COMPONENT is used to compute the variable speed target during final (IAS target).


      VAPP COMPUTATION

      VAPP, automatically displayed on the MCDU PERF APPR page, is computed as follows :

      VAPP = VLS + 1/3 of the TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT or VAPP = VLS + 5 knots, which ever is highest.

      "1/3 of the TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT" has 2 limits :
      	

      0 knots as the minimum value (no wind or tailwind)
      	

      +15 knots as the maximum value.

      The crew can manually modify the VAPP and TWR wind values on the PERF APPR page.


      SPEED TARGET COMPUTATION

      The FMGS continuously computes a speed target (IAS target) that is the MCDU VAPP value plus an additional variable gust.

      The IAS target is displayed on the PFD as a magenta triangle moving with the gust variation.


      Speed target computation above 400 feet :

      The gust is the instantaneous difference between the CURRENT HEADWIND COMPONENT and the TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT. It is always positive (or equal to zero for no wind or tailwind) IAS targets have 2 limits :
      	

      VAPP as minimum value
      	

      VFE in CONF FULL or VFE - 5 knots in CONF 1,2 or 3 as the maximum value.


      Speed target computation below 400 feet :

      The gust taken into account is only 1/3 of the instantaneous difference between the CURRENT HEADWIND and the TWR HEADWIND COMPONENT. This is done to prevent any important thrust variation in late final. Min and Max values remain unchanged.


      GROUND SPEED MINI (GS mini) COMPUTATION

      Ground speed mini concept has been defined to prevent the aircraft energy from dropping below a minimum level during final approach. The GS mini value is not displayed to the crew.

EXAMPLE



      IAS TARGET VALUES

      If we turn the previously explained speed target definition, into formulae, we obtain the following result :


      Above 400 feet

      If IAS TARGET = Max [VAPP, (VAPP + CURRENT HEADWIND - TWR HEADWIND)] (1)

Current wind in approach 	IAS target
(a) 090/50 	MAX [VAPP, (140 + 50 - 30) = 160 kt
(b) 090/10 	MAX [VAPP, (140 + 10 - 30) = 140 kt
(c) 270/10 	MAX [VAPP, (140 + 0 - 30) = 140 kt
(d) 090/30 	MAX [VAPP, (140 + 30 - 30) = 140 kt

      (1) For this computation, the TWR HEADWIND is voluntarily limited to 10 kt as a minimum.


      Below 400 feet

      IAS TARGET = Max [VAPP, VAPP + 1/3 (CURRENT HEADWIND - TWR HEADWIND)]

      That is equivalent to :

      IAS TARGET = Max (VAPP, VLS + 1/3 of CURRENT HEADWIND COMPONENT)

Current wind in approach 	IAS target
(e) 090/36 	MAX [VAPP, (130 + 12) = 142kt


A/THR MODE REVERSION

CONDITIONS 	EVENT 	CONSEQUENCES

• A/THR active in THR mode
• AP OFF
• FD engaged
• DES or "OP" DES engaged (CLB or OP CLB) 	aircraft speed = VLS (Vmax) 	
• A/THR reverts to SPD mode
• FD bars are removed

For detail refer to "Speed mode protection".

      Alpha floor

      The ALPHA FLOOR protection is triggered when the FMGCs receive a signal elaborated by the PRIMs. This signal is sent when the aircraft angle of attack is above a predetermined threshold function of the aircraft configuration. The A/THR is automatically activated and commands TOGA thrust regardless of thrust lever positions. This protection is available from lift off to 100 feet RA in approach.

      Following indications are then provided :
      	

      A-FLOOR on the FMA and on the EWD as long as floor conditions are met
      	

      TOGA LK on the FMA when the aircraft leaves the floor conditions.

      TOGA thrust is then frozen

      A FLOOR and TOGA LK are displayed in green and surrounded by an amber flashing box.

      In order to cancel the ALPHA FLOOR or TOGA LK thrust, disconnect the A/THR.


Note : Alpha Floor is inhibited :
	

in case of engine failure with flaps extended
	

in case of engine failure with derated TO selected
	

below 100 feet at landing
	

above M.53

Alpha Floor protection is lost in case of A/THR failure.

CAUTION

The system may consider an engine to be failed, when this engine's Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) is bellow 5°, and the TLA of other engine is above 5°. Therefore, Alpha Floor may be inhibited.

In manual thrust control, when simultaneously moving both thrust levers back to about the IDLE position, and in order to avoid undue Alpha Floor inhibition, check that both levers are well-aligned and that no TLA is below 5°.

[Anonymous]

Mister Caravelle,

Onde conseguir materiais a respeito do Airbus???

Tenho 3 livros aqui em casa feitos pela Airbus explicando o funcionamento do Sistema FBW. Gostaria de saber mais a respeito.

Arbraços!!!

[Anonymous]

Caros aeroforenses

Skydroll, acho que houve um mal-entendido: é possível utilizar as manetes do Airbus com autothrust como em uma aeronave convencional. Basta para isso que o sistema esteja disconnected.

CS-TMX, amigo de além-mar, muito legal e informativa a sua postagem. Nunca havia percebido que o acionamento do reverso dos Airbus A330/A340 é diferente do sistema do A320. Nos widebodies o reverso é acionado numa alavanca própria, já no A320 é no curso da manete principal.

Ranieri Ribeiro, não entendi a sua postagem: você está pedindo ou oferecendo informações? Quais são os livros que você tem?

Saudações

Caravelle

[Omykron]

eh lenda tb a história do auto brake max apenas em situações de emergencia?

[Anonymous]

O auto brake em MAX e somente usado para decolagens, no caso de uma abortagem. O normal e ele na posicao LOW ou MED para o pouso. Caso haja falhas no sistema, pisa-se nos freios com os pes. Caso ainda persista, Anti-skid/Nose Wheel Steering OFF, e pisa-se nos freios monitorando 1000 psi. Caso ainda nao haja frenagem, avalia-se o comprimento de pista restante, e usa-se o parking brake.

[Anonymous]

Caravelle, estou pedindo informações a respeito od sistemas do Airbus...

Quanto ao livro sobre o FBW, são feitos pela própria Airbus, um fala da proteção quanto ao grande angulo de ataque, outro falando do FBW em si e um terceiro sobre o FCU (Flight Control Unit) do Airbus.

Arbraços!!!

[Anonymous]

Caros aeroforenses

Ranieri Ribeiro, pode perguntar o que quiseres. Dentro do possível, procurarei responder. O que eu não souber, vou pesquisar ou pedir auxílio a algum colega que voa ou conhece Airbus mais do que eu.

CS-TMX, amigo de além-mar, valeu pelas preciosas informações. A imagem do sidestickque postaste neste outro tópico não está mais aparecendo. Legal saber que o reverso dos Airbus FBW widebodies são diferentes dos A320. Alguém sabe o motivo? E qual a razão dos Airbus FBW widebodies não terem aquela escala angular entre as manetes como no A320?

Saudações

Caravelle[/url]

[Sandro]

So teve mesmo aquele problema na França. no voo de demostação em 88 se não estou encanado, que entrou mata a dentro, segundo estudos o avião achou pela pouca velocidade e altura, que o mesmo iria pousar,, depois a Air bus, alterou o sistema,!

[CS-TMX]

CS-TMX, amigo de além-mar, valeu pelas preciosas informações. A imagem do sidestickque postaste neste outro tópico não está mais aparecendo. Legal saber que o reverso dos Airbus FBW widebodies são diferentes dos A320.

Caravelle,

Infelizmente, devido a restrições de espaço em servidor, eu costumo manter as imagens online apenas durante algumas semanas, em regime de rotatividade.

De qualquer aqui fica de novo essa imagem:


Tanto os textos como as imagens são retiradas do FCOM do A330-300. Tenho também do A320-200.

Para comparação, deixo também a imagem descritiva do quadrant throttle do A320:



Mais uma vez, essas imagens ficarão online por tempo limitado.

Abraços,

[Anonymous]

Caros aeroforenses

So teve mesmo aquele problema na França. no voo de demostação em 88 se não estou encanado, que entrou mata a dentro, segundo estudos o avião achou pela pouca velocidade e altura, que o mesmo iria pousar,, depois a Air bus, alterou o sistema,!

Sandro, há controvérsias. Estude melhor este ocorrido e não se baseie em boatos. Parece que a arremetida foi iniciada tardiamente. Já ouvi falar que eram pilotos da Airbus. Mentira! Eram pilotos da Air France, incluindo o chefe do equipamento.

Quem já viu aquele vídeo do TAP arremetendo ou do A340-600 manobrando em Le Bourget vai deixar vários "preconceitos" sobre os Airbus de lado.

Uma bobagem que ouço é sobre a limitação de envelope de võo não permitir desvio de tráfego em rota de colisão. Convenhamos, com 67º de bank angle não vai desviar? Não precisa de 90º (na faca) para desviar.

Saudações

Caravelle

[Anonymous]

Exatamente. Ficam se baseando nos documentários do Discovery Channel dá nisso: acaba dizendo bobagem. Essa de que "o computador entendeu que era pra pousar" é o fim da picada hehe. Até o aúdio desse video do Discovery foi editado.

[Sandro]

Olha o que achei!! aqui! http://www.airdisaster.com/investigatio ... html#crash



By: Chris Kilroy
In the first crash of a new 'Fly-By-Wire' aircraft, the Airbus A320-100 impacted trees while performing a fly-by at an airshow and burst into flames. The crew, and Air France maintenance officials, have all been sentenced to probation for manslaughter; the Captain has been imprisoned. Evidence, including photographs, has now been exposed that an Airbus official at the scene switched the Digital Flight Data Recorder before the court hearing.

Since May 1998, it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was switched after the accident. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the recorder presented to the Court is NOT the one taken from the aircraft after the accident. Details: See below


Contents:
The Crash
The Official Version
The Captain's Version
The OEB's
The Black Boxes
The Engines: CFMI assesses CFMI
Germain Sengelin
Norbert Jacquet
The Forest
Why shouldn't one believe the official version?
The Sentence
The IPSC report: The Flight Data Recorder has been substituted!


The Crash
On Sunday June 26, 1988, the airclub at the airfield of Mulhouse-Habsheim in Alsace/France had organized with Air France a low approach of a brand new Airbus A320 in landing configuration. Michel Asseline was the pilot in command of F-GFKC, Pierre Mazière was his first officer, when the aircraft overflew the airfield at 2 pm in wonderful sunny weather. Some seconds later the aircraft touched the tops of the trees behind the runway and crashed into a forest. 3 passengers died in the accident and about 50 were injured. The accident was filmed by a video amateur and has been shown dozens of times on TV. F-GFKC was the first of a couple of aircraft of this type to be lost in the next few years (see below).

The Black Boxes were taken undamaged from the aircraft 2 hours after the crash, but unfortunately they have been out of control of justice for 10 days, and since May 1998 it is proven that the Flight Data Recorder was substituted during this period. The Lausanne Institute of Police Forensic Evidence and Criminology (IPSC) comes to the conclusion that the Black Boxes used in the trial to declare the pilot guilty are NOT the ones taken from the aircraft.

The aircraft was new, Airbus was waiting for commands, a lack of confidence in the highly computerized aircraft would have meant a commercial disaster - not only for the manufacturer, but also for the French administration, which has a share in the European Airbus consortium.

The Official Version
The French minister of transportation (Louis Mermoz), the company (Air France) and the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus Industry) declared with precipitation shortly after the accident that the aircraft was beyond any doubt. The final report (published 18 months after the accident) comes to the same conclusion, but the authenticity of the data on which the report has always been very doubtful, and since May 1998 it is proven by the report of the Lausanne IPSC that the Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) was substituted after the crash. For 10 years the media have not stopped reporting about the anomalies which have accompanied the technical investigation of the accident from the beginning.

[Anonymous]

Caros aeroforenses

Sandro, eu não quis em momento algum lhe ofender, eu só sugeri buscar fonts confiáveis.

Qual a credibilidade desse Chris Kilroy? Eu só sei que ele é norte-americano, nascido em Las Vegas, em... 4 de julho de 1980. Um tanto suspeito, não? Para quem não sabe, 4 de julho é a data nacional dos EUA. E um rapaz de 25 anos é meio novinho pra ser investigador, não? Acredito que ele não seja investigador nem algo parecido. A versão dele é bem conveniente para os fabricantes norte-americanos. No meu ponto de vista, parcial e tendenciosa. Baseada em "boatos reais".

Sugiro aqui uma versão "não-palpite" sobre o acidente:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec ... 19880626-0

A propósito, como anda a investigação dos acidentes do TWA 800 e do 767 da EgyptAir? Elas foram abafadas? Foram falhas mecânicas? E aquela versão patética e anti-árabe de suicídio no 767 egípcio?

Um professor me contou que os norte-americanos, ao chegarem no local de um acidente, antes de qualquer coisa, avaliam se compromete o produto deles. Caso negativo, permitem a investigação envolvendo outros países.

Saudações

Caravelle

[Sandro]

Caros aeroforenses

Sandro, eu não quis em momento algum lhe ofender, eu só sugeri buscar fonts confiáveis.

Qual a credibilidade desse Chris Kilroy? Eu só sei que ele é norte-americano, nascido em Las Vegas, em... 4 de julho de 1980. Um tanto suspeito, não? Para quem não sabe, 4 de julho é a data nacional dos EUA. E um rapaz de 25 anos é meio novinho pra ser investigador, não? Acredito que ele não seja investigador nem algo parecido. A versão dele é bem conveniente para os fabricantes norte-americanos. No meu ponto de vista, parcial e tendenciosa. Baseada em "boatos reais".

Sugiro aqui uma versão "não-palpite" sobre o acidente:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec ... 19880626-0

A propósito, como anda a investigação dos acidentes do TWA 800 e do 767 da EgyptAir? Elas foram abafadas? Foram falhas mecânicas? E aquela versão patética e anti-árabe de suicídio no 767 egípcio?

Um professor me contou que os norte-americanos, ao chegarem no local de um acidente, antes de qualquer coisa, avaliam se compromete o produto deles. Caso negativo, permitem a investigação envolvendo outros países.

Saudações

Caravelle

o A320 foi erro do piloto então??

É bom não-palpitar, TWA 800, Explodiu o tanque central, o 767 não sei mas pela caixa preta, (só se os americanos mentiram na gravação, não estava lá para saber se é verdade ou não a caixa preta pode ter sido manipulada, etc.,etc,etc, ou to misturando com outro acidentes) aconteceu uma briga na Cabine, um tentando colocar para baixo o avião e o outro para cima, +- isto!!

[Anonymous]

o A320 foi erro do piloto então??

Sim.